Free Will by Jonathan Edwards
Free Will by Jonathan Edwards
Est. Date. 1709-1758
Orig. Language. English
Orig. Writer. Jonathan Edwards
One of the greatest American Puritan theologians, Jonathan Edwards too the Calvinistic position and
developed this work as an argument against Arminianism.
Concerning the Nature of the Will
It may possibly be thought, that there is no great need of going about to define or describe the Will; this
word being generally as well understood as any other words we can use to explain it: and so perhaps it
would be, had not philosophers, metaphysicians, and polemic divines, brought the matter into obscurity
by the things they have said of it. But since it is so, I think it may be of some use, and will tend to greater
clearness in The following discourse, to say a few things concerning it.
And therefore I observe, that the Will (without any metaphysical refining) is, That by which the mind
chooses any thing. The faculty of the will, is that power, or principle of mind, by which it is capable of
choosing: an act of the will is the same as an act of choosing or choice...
Concerning the Determination of the Will
By determining the Will, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must be intended, causing that the act
of the Will or choice should be thus, and not otherwise: and the Will is said to be determined, when, in
consequence of some action, or influence, its choice is directed to, and fixed upon a particular object. As
when we speak of the determination of motion, we mean causing the motion of the body to be in such a
direction, rather than another.
The Determination of the Will, supposes an effect, which must have a cause. If the Will be determined,
there is a Determiner. This must be supposed to be intended even by them that say, The Will
determines itself. If it be so, the Will is both Determiner and determined; it is a cause that acts and
produces effects upon itself, and is the object of its own influence and action...
It is sufficient to my present purpose to say, It is that motive, which, as it stands in view of the mind, is
the strongest, that determines the will. But may be necessary that I should a little explain my meaning.
By motive I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that
be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things may concur, and unite their
strength, to induce the mind; and when it is so, all together are as one complex motive. And when I
speak of the strongest motive, I have respect to the strength of the whole that operates to induce a
particular act of volition, whether that be the strength of one thing alone, or of many together.
Of the Distinctions of Natural and Moral Necessity, and Inability
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To give some instances of this moral Inability.— A woman of great honor and chastity may have a moral
Inability to prostitute herself to her slave. A child of great love and duty to his parents, may be thus
unable to kill his father. A very lascivious man, in case of certain opportunities and temptations, and in
the absence of such and such restraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying his lust. A drunkard, under
such and such circumstances, may be unable to forbear taking strong drink. A very malicious man may
be unable to exert benevolent acts to an enemy, or to desire his prosperity; yea, some may be so under
the power of a vile disposition, that they may be unable to love those who are most worthy of their
esteem and affection. A strong habit of virtue, and a great degree of holiness, may cause a moral
Inability to love wickedness in general, and may render a man unable to take complacence in wicked
persons or things; or to choose a wicked in preference to a virtuous life. And on the other hand, a great
degree of habitual wickedness may lay a man under an Inability to love and choose holiness; and render
him utterly unable to love an infinitely holy Being, or to choose and cleave to him as his chief good.
Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of Moral Agency
The plain and obvious meaning of the words Freedom and Liberty, in common speech, is The power,
opportunity, or advantage, that any one has, to do as he pleases. Or in other words, his being free from
hindrance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting in any respect as he wills....
What has been said may be sufficient to show what is meant by Liberty, according to the common
notions of mankind, and in the usual and primary acceptation of the word: but the word, as used by
Arminians, Pelagians, and others, who oppose the Calvinists, has an entirely different signification.—
These several things belong to their notion of Liberty. 1. That it consists in a self-determining power in
the Will, or a certain sovereignty the Will has over itself, and its own acts, whereby it determines its own
volitions; so as not to be dependent, in its determinations, on any cause without itself, nor determined
by any thing prior to its own acts. 2. Indifference belongs to Liberty in their notion of it, or that the mind,
previous to the act of volition, be in equilibria. 3. contingence is another thing that belongs and is
essential to it; not in the common acceptation of the word, as that has been already explained, but as
opposed to all necessity, or any fixed and certain I connexion with some previous ground or reason of its
existence. They suppose the essence of Liberty so much to consist in these things, that unless the will of
man be free in this sense, he has no real freedom, how much soever, he may be at Liberty to act
according to his will.
Let us suppose, as these divines do, that there are no acts of the soul, strictly speaking, but free
Volitions; then it will follow, that the soul is an active being in nothing further than it is a voluntary or
elecive being; and when ever it produces effects actively, it produces effects voluntarily and electively.
But to produce effects thus, is the same thing as to produce effects in consequence of, and according to
its own choice. And if so, then surely the soul does not by its activity produce all its own acts of will or
choice themselves; for this, by the supposition, is to produce all its free acts of choice volutarily an
electively or in consequence of its own free acts of choice, which brings the matter directly to the
forementioned contradiction, of a free act of choice before the first free act of choice.— According to
these gentlemen’s own notion of action, if there arises in the mind a Volition without a free act of the
Will to produce it, the mind is not the voluntary Cause of that Volition; because it does not arise from,
nor is regulated by,choice or design. And therefore it cannot be, that the mind should be the active,
voluntary, determining Cause of the first and leading Volition that relates to the afffair.— The mind
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being a designing Cause, only enables it to produce effects in consequence of its design; it will not
enable it to be the designing Cause of all its own designs. The mind being an elective Cause, will enable
it to produce effects only in consequence of its elections, and according to them; but cannot enable it to
be the elective Cause of all its own elections; because that supposes an election before the first election.
So the mind being an active Cause enables it to produce effects in consequence of its own acts, but
cannot enable it to be the determining Cause of all its own acts; for that is, in the same manner, a
contradiction; as it supposes a determining act conversant about the first act, and prior to it, having a
causal influence on its existence, and manner of existence...
So that let Armninians turn which way they please with their notion of liberty, consisting in the Will
determining its own acts, their notion destroys itself. If they hold every free act of Will to be determined
by the soul’s own free choice, or foregoing free act of Will; forgoing, either in the order of time, or
nature; it implies that gross contradiction, that the first free act belonging to the affair, is determined by
a free act which is before it. Or if they say, that the free acts of the Will are determined by some other
art of the soul, and not an act of will or choice; this also destroys their notion of liberty consisting in the
acts of the Will being determined by the will itself; or if they hold that the acts of the Will are
determined by nothing at all that is prior to them, but that they are contingent in that sense, that they
are determined and fixed by no cause at all; this also destroys their notion of liberty, consisting in the
Will determining its own acts.
Having proved, that God has a certain and infallible Prescience of the voluntary acts of moral agents, I
come now, in the second place, to show the consequence; how it follows from hence, that these events
are necessary, with a Necessity of connexion or consequence.
The chief Arminian divines, so far as I have had opportunity to observe, deny this consequence; and
affirm, that if such Foreknowledge be allowed, it is no evidence of any necessity of the event foreknown.
Now I desire, that this matter may be particularly and thoroughly inquired into. I cannot but think that
on particular and full consideration, it may be perfectly determined, whether it be indeed so or not...
But if there be any future event, whose existence is contingent, without all Necessity, the future
existence of the event is absolutely without evidence. If there be any evidence of it, it must be one of
these two sorts, either self-evidence or proof; an evident thing must be either evident in itself; or
evident in something else: that is, evident by connexion with something else....
I would observe one thing further; that if it be as those forementioned writers suppose, that God’s
Foreknowledge is not the cause, but the effect of the existence of the event foreknown; this is so far
from showing that this Foreknowledge doth not infer the Necessity of the existence of that event, that it
rather shows the contrary the more plainly. Because it shows the existence of the event to be so settled
and firm, that it is as if it had already been; inasmuch as in effect it actually exists already; its future
existence has already had actual influence and efficiency, and has produced an effect...
Command and Obligation to Obedience, consistent with moral Inability to obey.
A person, whose strength is no more than sufficient to lift the weight of one hundred pounds, is as truly
and really unable to lift one hundred and one pounds, as ten thousand pounds; but yet he is further
from being able to lift the latter weight than the former; and so, according to the common use of
speech, has a greater Inability for it. So it is in moral Inability. A man is truly morally unable to choose
contrary to a present inclination, which in the least degree prevails; or, contrary to that motive, which,
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all things considered, has strength and advantage now to move the Will, in the least degree, superior to
all other motives in view: but yet he is further from ability to insist a very strong habit, and a violent and
deeply rooted inclination, or a motive vastly exceeding all others in strength. And again, the Inability
may, in some respects, be called greater in some instances than others, as it may be more general and
extensive to all acts of that kind. So men may be said to be unable in a different sense, and to be further
from moral ability, who have that moral Inability which is general and habitual, than they who have only
that Inability which is occasional and particular. Thus in cases of natural inability; he that is born blind
may be said to be unable to see, in a different manner, and is, in some respects, further from being able
to see, than he whose sight is hindered by a transient cloud or mist.
That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavors, which, is supposed to excuse in the non-performance of
things in themselves good, particularly considered.
So, a man of an exceedingly corrupt and wicked heart, who has no love to God and Jesus Christ, but, on
the contrary, being very profanely and carnally inclined, has the greatest distaste of the things of
religion, and enmity against them; yet being of a family, that, from one generation to another, have
most of them died, in youth, of an hereditary consumption; and so having little hope of living long; and
having been instructed in the necessity of a supreme love to Christ, and latitude for his death and
sufferings, in order to his salvation from eternal misery; if under these circumstances he should, through
fear of eternal torments, wish he had such a disposition; but his profane and carnal heart remaining, he
continues still in his habitual distaste of; and enmity to God and religion, and wholly without any
exercise of that love and gratitude, (as doubtless the very devils themselves, notwithstanding all the
devilishness of their temper, would wish for a holy heart, if by that means they could get out of hell) in
this case, there is no sincere Willingness to love Christ and choose him as his chief good: these holy
dispositions and exercises are not at all the direct object of the Will: they truly share no part of the
inclination or desire of the soul; but all is terminated on deliverance from torment: and these graces and
pious volitions, notwithstanding this forced consent, are looked upon as in themselves undesirable; as
when a sick man desires a dose he greatly abhors, in order to save his life.